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Abstract
In 1977, Young proposed a voting scheme that extends the Condorcet Principle based on
the fewest possible number of voters whose removal yields a Condorcet winner. We prove that
both the winner and the ranking problem for Young elections is complete for PNP‖ , the class of
problems solvable in polynomial time by parallel access to NP. Analogous results for Lewis
Carroll’s 1876 voting scheme were recently established by Hemaspaandra et al. In contrast,
we prove that the winner and ranking problems in Fishburn’s homogeneous variant of Carroll’s
voting scheme can be solved efficiently by linear programming.
1 Introduction
More than a decade ago, Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89b,BTT89a,BTT92] initiated the
study of electoral systems with respect to their computational properties. In particular, they
proved NP hardness lower bounds [BTT89b] for determining the winner in the voting schemes
proposed by Dodgson (more commonly known by his pen name, Lewis Carroll) and by Kemeny,
and they studied complexity issues related to the problem of manipulating elections by strategic
voting [BTT89a,BTT92]. Since then, a number of related results and improvements of their results
have been obtained. Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR97] classified both the winner
and the ranking problem for Dodgson elections by proving them complete for PNP‖ , the class of
problems solvable in polynomial time by parallel access to an NP oracle. E. Hemaspaandra (as
cited in [HH00]) and Spakowski and Vogel [SV01] obtained the analogous result for Kemeny
elections; a joint paper by E. Hemaspaandra, Spakowski, and Vogel is in preparation. For many
further interesting results and the state of the art regarding computational politics, we refer to the
survey [HH00].
In this paper, we study complexity issues related to Young and Dodgson elections. In 1977,
Young proposed a voting scheme that extends the Condorcet Principle based on the fewest possible
number of voters whose removal makes a given candidate c the Condorcet winner, i.e., c defeats all
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other candidates by a strict majority of the votes. We prove that both the winner and the ranking
problem for Young elections is complete for PNP‖ . To this end, we give a reduction from the problem
Maximum Set Packing Compare, which we also prove PNP‖ -complete.
In Section 3, we study a homogeneous variant of Dodgson elections that was introduced by
Fishburn [Fis77]. In contrast to the above-mentioned result of Hemaspaandra et al. [HHR97], we
show that both the winner and the ranking problem for Fishburn’s homogeneous Dodgson elections
can be solved efficiently by a linear program that is based on an integer linear program of Bartholdi
et al. [BTT89b].
2 Complexity of the Winner Problem for Young Elections
2.1 Some Background from Social Choice Theory
Let C be the set of all candidates (or alternatives). We assume that each voter has strict
preferences over the candidates. Formally, the preference order of each voter is strict (i.e., irreflexive
and antisymmetric), transitive, and complete (i.e., all candidates are ranked by each voter). An
election is given by a preference profile, a pair 〈C, V 〉 such that C is a set of candidates and V is
the multiset of the voters’ preference orders on C . Note that distinct voters may have the same
preferences over the candidates. A voting scheme (or social choice function, SCF for short) is a rule
for how to determine the winner(s) of an election; i.e., an SCF maps any given preference profile
to society’s aggregate choice set, the set of candidates who have won the election. For any SCF f
and any preference profile 〈C, V 〉, f(〈C, V 〉) denotes the set of winning candidates. For example,
an election is won according to the majority rule by any candidate who is preferred over any other
candidate by a strict majority of the voters. Such a candidate is called the Condorcet winner.
In 1785, Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, the Marquis de Condorcet, noted in his seminal
essay [Con85] that whenever there are at least three candidates, say A, B, and C , the majority rule
may yield cycles: A defeats B and B defeats C , and yet C defeats A. Thus, even though each
individual voter has a rational (i.e., transitive or non-cyclic) preference order, society may behave
irrationally and Condorcet winners do not always exist. This observation is known as the Condorcet
Paradox. The Condorcet Principle says that for each preference profile, the winner of the election
is to be determined by the majority rule. An SCF is said to be a Condorcet SCF if and only if it
respects the Condorcet Principle in the sense that the Condorcet winner is elected whenever he or
she exists. Note that Condorcet winners are uniquely determined if they exist.
Many Condorcet SCFs have been proposed in the social choice literature; for an overview of the
most central ones, we refer to the work of Fishburn [Fis77]. They extend the Condorcet Principle in
a way that avoids the troubling feature of the majority rule. In this paper, we will focus on only two
such Condorcet SCFs, the Dodgson voting scheme [Dod76] and the Young voting scheme [You77].
In 1876, Charles L. Dodgson (better known by his pen name, Lewis Carroll) proposed a voting
scheme [Dod76] that suggests that we remain most faithful to the Condorcet Principle if the election
is won by any candidate who is “closest” to being a Condorcet winner. To define “closeness,” each
candidate c in a given election 〈C, V 〉 is assigned a score, denoted DodgsonScore(C, c, V ), which
is the smallest number of sequential interchanges of adjacent candidates in the voters’ preferences
that are needed to make c a Condorcet winner. Here, one interchange means that in (any) one of the
voters two adjacent candidates are switched. A Dodgson winner is any candidate with minimum
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Dodgson score. Using Dodgson scores, one can also tell who of two given candidates is ranked
better according to the Dodgson SCF.
Young’s approach to extending the Condorcet Principle is reminiscent of Dodgson’s approach
in that it is also based on altered profiles. Unlike Dogson, however, Young [You77] suggests that we
remain most faithful to the Condorcet Principle if the election is won by any candidate who is made
a Condorcet winner by removing the fewest possible number of voters, instead of doing the fewest
possible number of switches in the voters’ preferences. For each candidate c in a given preference
profile 〈C, V 〉, define YoungScore(C, c, V ) to be the size of a largest subset of V for which c is a
Condorcet winner. A Young winner is any candidate with a maximum Young score.
Homogeneous variants of these voting schemes will be defined in Section 3.
2.2 Complexity Issues Related to Voting Schemes
To study computational complexity issues related to Dodgson’s voting scheme, Bartholdi,
Tovey, and Trick [BTT89b] defined the following decision problems.
Dodgson Winner
Instance: A preference profile 〈C, V 〉 and a designated candidate c ∈ C .
Question: Is c a Dodgson winner of the election? That is, is it true that for all d ∈ C ,
DodgsonScore(C, c, V ) ≤ DodgsonScore(C, d, V )?
Dodgson Ranking
Instance: A preference profile 〈C, V 〉 and two designated candidates c, d ∈ C .
Question: Does c tie-or-defeat d in the election? That is, is it true that
DodgsonScore(C, c, V ) ≤ DodgsonScore(C, d, V )?
Bartholdi et al. [BTT89b] established an NP-hardness lower bound for both these problems.
Their result was optimally improved by Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR97] who
proved that Dodgson Winner and Dodgson Ranking are complete for PNP‖ , the class of problems
solvable in polynomial time with parallel (i.e., truth-table) access to an NP oracle.
As above, we define the corresponding decision problems for Young elections as follows.
Young Winner
Instance: A preference profile 〈C, V 〉 and a designated candidate c ∈ C .
Question: Is c a Young winner of the election? That is, is it true that for all d ∈ C ,
YoungScore(C, c, V ) ≥ YoungScore(C, d, V )?
Young Ranking
Instance: A preference profile 〈C, V 〉 and two designated candidates c, d ∈ C .
Question: Does c tie-or-defeat d in the election? That is, is it true that
YoungScore(C, c, V ) ≥ YoungScore(C, d, V )?
2.3 Hardness of Determining Young Winners
The main result in this section is that the problems Young Winner and Young Ranking are
complete for PNP‖ . In Theorem 2.3 below, we give a reduction from the problem Maximum Set
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Packing Compare that is defined below. For a given familiy S of sets, let κ(S) be the maximum
number of pairwise disjoint sets in S .
Maximum Set Packing Compare
Instance: Two families S1 and S2 of sets such that, for i ∈ {1, 2}, each set S ∈ Si is a
nonempty subset of a given set Bi.
Question: Does it hold that κ(S1) ≥ κ(S2)?
To prove that Maximum Set Packing Compare is PNP‖ -complete, we give a reduction from the
problem Independence Number Compare, which has also been used in [HRS01]. Let G be an
undirected, simple graph. An independent set of G is any subset I of the vertex set of G such that
no two vertices in I are adjacent. For any graph G, let α(G) be the independence number of G, i.e.,
the size of a maximum independent set of G.
Independence Number Compare
Instance: Two graphs G1 and G2.
Question: Does it hold that α(G1) ≥ α(G2)?
Using the techniques of Wagner [Wag87], it can be shown that the problem Independence
Number Compare is PNP‖ -complete; see [SV00, Thm. 12] for an explicit proof of this result.
Lemma 2.1 (cf. [Wag87,SV00]) Independence Number Compare is PNP‖ -complete.
Theorem 2.2 Maximum Set Packing Compare is PNP‖ -complete.
Proof. We give a polynomial-time many-one reduction from the problem Independence Number
Compare to the problem Maximum Set Packing Compare. LetG1 and G2 be two given graphs. For
i ∈ {1, 2}, define Bi to be the set of edges of Gi, and define Si so as to contain exactly ‖V (Gi)‖
subsets of Bi: For each vertex v of Gi, add to Si the set of edges incident to v. Thus, for each
i ∈ {1, 2}, we have α(Gi) = κ(Si), which proves the theorem.
Theorem 2.3 Young Ranking is PNP‖ -complete.
Proof. It is easy to see that Young Ranking and Young Winner are in PNP‖ . To prove the P
NP
‖ lower
bound, we give a polynomial-time many-one reduction from the problem Maximum Set Packing
Compare. Let B1 = {x1, x2, . . . , xm} and B2 = {y1, y2, . . . , yn} be two given sets, and let S1
and S2 be given families of subsets of B1 and B2, respectively. Recall that κ(Si), for i ∈ {1, 2}, is
the maximum number of pairwise disjoint sets in Si; w.l.o.g., we may assume that κ(Si) > 2.
We define a preference profile 〈C, V 〉 such that c and d are designated candidates in C , and it
holds that:
YoungScore(C, c, V ) = 2 · κ(S1) + 1; (2.1)
YoungScore(C, d, V ) = 2 · κ(S2) + 1. (2.2)
Define the set C of candidates as follows:
• create the two designated candidates c and d;
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• for each element xi of B1, create a candidate xi;
• for each element yi of B2, create a candidate yi;
• create two auxiliary candidates, a and b.
Define the set V of voters as follows:
• Voters representing S1: For each set E ∈ S1, create a single voter vE as follows:
– Enumerate E as {e1, e2, . . . , e‖E‖} (renaming the candidates ei ∈ {x1, x2, . . . , xm}
for notational convenience), and enumerate its complement E = B1 − E as
{e1, e2, . . . , em−‖E‖}.
– To make the preference orders easier to parse, we use
“
−→
E ” to represent the text string “e1 > e2 > · · · > e‖E‖”;
“
−→
E ” to represent the text string “e1 > e2 > · · · > em−‖E‖”;
“
−→
B1” to represent the text string “x1 > x2 > · · · > xm”;
“
−→
B2” to represent the text string “y1 > y2 > · · · > yn”.
– Create one voter vE with preference order:
−→
E > a > c >
−→
E >
−→
B2 > b > d. (2.3)
• Additionally, create two voters with preference order:
c >
−→
B1 > a >
−→
B2 > b > d, (2.4)
and create ‖S1‖ − 1 voters with preference order:
−→
B1 > c > a >
−→
B2 > b > d. (2.5)
• Voters representing S2: For each set F ∈ S2, create a single voter vF as follows:
– Enumerate F as {f1, f2, . . . , f‖F‖} (renaming the candidates fj ∈ {y1, y2, . . . , yn}
for notational convenience), and enumerate its complement F = B1 − F as
{f1, f2, . . . , fn−‖F‖}.
– To make the preference orders easier to parse, we use
“
−→
F ” to represent the text string “f1 > f2 > · · · > f‖F‖”;
“
−→
F ” to represent the text string “f1 > f2 > · · · > fn−‖F‖”.
– Create one voter vF with preference order:
−→
F > b > d >
−→
F >
−→
B1 > a > c. (2.6)
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• Additionally, create two voters with preference order:
d >
−→
B2 > b >
−→
B1 > a > c, (2.7)
and create ‖S2‖ − 1 voters with preference order:
−→
B2 > d > b >
−→
B1 > a > c. (2.8)
We now prove Equation (2.1): YoungScore(C, c, V ) = 2 · κ(S1) + 1.
Let E1, E2, . . . , Eκ(S1) ∈ S1 be κ(S1) disjoint subsets of B1. Consider the following subset
V̂ ⊆ V of the voters. V̂ consists of:
• every voter vEi corresponding to the set Ei, where 1 ≤ i ≤ κ(S1);
• the two voters given in Equation (2.4);
• κ(S1)− 1 voters of the form given in Equation (2.5).
Then, ‖V̂ ‖ = 2 · κ(S1)+ 1. Note that a strict majority of the voters in V̂ prefer c over any other
candidate, and thus c is a Condorcet winner in 〈C, V̂ 〉. Hence,
YoungScore(C, c, V ) ≥ 2 · κ(S1) + 1.
Conversely, to prove that YoungScore(C, c, V ) ≤ 2 · κ(S1) + 1, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4 For any λ with 3 < λ ≤ ‖S1‖ + 1, let Vλ be any subset of V such that Vλ contains
exactly λ voters of the form (2.4) or (2.5) and c is the Condorcet winner in 〈C, Vλ〉. Then, Vλ contains
exactly λ− 1 voters of the form (2.3) and no voters of the form (2.6), (2.7), or (2.8). Moreover, the
λ− 1 voters of the form (2.3) in Vλ represent pairwise disjoint sets from S1.
Proof of Lemma 2.4. Let Vλ for fixed λ be given as above. Consider the subset of Vλ that consists
of the λ voters of the form (2.4) or (2.5). Every candidate xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, is preferred to c by the
at least λ − 2 voters of the form (2.5). Since c is the Condorcet winner in 〈C, Vλ〉, there exist at
least λ − 1 > 2 voters in Vλ who prefer c to each xi. By construction, these voters must be of
the form (2.3) or (2.4). Since there are at most two voters of the form (2.4), there exists at least
one voter of the form (2.3), say v˜. Since the voters of the form (2.3) represent S1, which does not
contain empty sets, there exists some candidate xj who is preferred to c by v˜. In particular, c must
outpoll xj in 〈C, Vλ〉 and thus needs more than (λ − 2) + 1 votes of the form (2.3) or (2.4). There
are at most two voters of the form (2.4); hence, c must be preferred by at least λ − 2 voters of the
form (2.3) that are distinct from v˜. Summing up, Vλ contains at least λ− 1 voters of the form (2.3).
On the other hand, since c is the Condorcet winner in 〈C, Vλ〉, c must in particular outpoll a,
who is preferred to c by the at most λ voters of the form (2.4) or (2.5). Hence, Vλ may contain at
most λ − 1 voters of the form (2.3), (2.6), (2.7), or (2.8). It follows that Vλ contains exactly λ− 1
voters of the form (2.3) and no voters of the form (2.6), (2.7), or (2.8).
For a contradiction, suppose that there is a candidate xj who is preferred to c by more than one
voter of the form (2.3) in Vλ. Then, c is preferred to xj by at most two voters of the form (2.4) and
by at most (λ−1)−2 = λ−3 voters of the form (2.3); xj is preferred to c by at least λ−2 voters of
the form (2.5) and by at least two voters of the form (2.3). Since c thus has at most λ− 1 votes and
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xj has at least λ votes in Vλ, c is not a Condorcet winner in 〈C, Vλ〉, a contradiction. Thus, every
candidate xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, is preferred to c by at most one voter of the form (2.3) in Vλ, which means
that the λ− 1 voters of the form (2.3) in Vλ represent pairwise disjoint sets from S1. Lemma 2.4
To continue the proof of Theorem 2.3, let k = YoungScore(C, c, V ). Let V̂ ⊆ V be a subset of
size k such that c is the Condorcet winner in 〈C, V̂ 〉. Suppose that there are exactly λ ≤ ‖S1‖ + 1
voters of the form (2.4) or (2.5) in V̂ . Since c, the Condorcet winner of 〈C, V̂ 〉, must in particular
outpoll a, we have λ ≥
⌈
k+1
2
⌉
. By our assumption that κ(S1) > 2, it follows from k ≥ 2 ·κ(S1)+1
that λ > 3. Lemma 2.4 then implies that there are exactly λ − 1 voters of the form (2.3) in V̂ that
represent pairwise disjoint sets from S1, and V̂ contains no voters of the form (2.6), (2.7), or (2.8).
Hence, k = 2 · λ− 1 is odd, and k−12 = λ− 1 ≤ κ(S1), which proves Equation (2.1).
Equation (2.2) can be proven analogously. Thus, we have κ(S1) ≥ κ(S2) if and only if
YoungScore(C, c, V ) ≥ YoungScore(C, d, V ), which completes the proof of Theorem 2.3.
Theorem 2.5 Young Winner is PNP‖ -complete.
Proof. To prove the theorem, we modify the reduction from Theorem 2.3 to a reduction from the
problem Maximum Set Packing Compare to the problem Young Winner as follows. Let 〈C, V 〉
be the preference profile constructed in the proof of Theorem 2.3 with the designated candidates c
and d. We alter this profile such that all other candidates do worse than c and d.
From 〈C, V 〉, we construct a new preference profile 〈D,W〉. To define the new set D of
candidates, replace every candidate g ∈ C except c and d by ‖V ‖ candidates g1, g2, . . . , g‖V ‖.
To define the new voter set W , replace each occurrence of candidate g in the i-th preference
order of V by the text string:
gi mod ‖V ‖ > gi+1 mod ‖V ‖ > gi+2 mod ‖V ‖ > · · · > gi+‖V ‖−1 mod ‖V ‖.
It is easy to see that this modification does not change the Young score of c and d. On the other
hand, the Young score of any other candidate now is at most 1. Thus, there is no candidate h with
YoungScore(C, h, V ) > YoungScore(C, c, V ) or YoungScore(C, h, V ) > YoungScore(C, d, V ).
Hence, κ(S1) ≥ κ(S2) if and only if c is a winner of the election 〈D,W〉.
3 Homogeneous Young and Dodgson Voting Schemes
Social choice theorists have studied many “reasonable” properties that any “fair” election
procedure arguably should satisfy, including very natural properties such as nondictatorship,
monotonicity, the Pareto Principle, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. One of the most
notable results in this regard is Arrow’s famous Impossibility Theorem [Arr63] stating that the just-
mentioned four properties are logically inconsistent, and thus no “fair” voting scheme can exist.
In this section, we are concerned with another quite natural property, the homogeneity of voting
schemes (see [Fis77,You77]).
Definition 3.1 A voting scheme f is said to be homogeneous if and only if for each preference
profile 〈C, V 〉 and for all positive integers q, it holds that f(〈C, V 〉) = f(〈C, qV 〉), where qV
denotes V replicated q times.
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That is, homogeneity means that splitting each voter v ∈ V into q voters, each of whom has the
same preference order as v, yields exactly the same choice set of winning candidates.
Fishburn [Fis77] showed that neither the Dodgson nor the Young voting schemes are
homogeneous. For the Dodgson SCF, he presented a counterexample with seven voters and eight
candidates; for the Young SCF, he modified a preference profile constructed by Young with 37
voters and five candidates. Fishburn [Fis77] provided the following limit devise in order to define
homogeneous variants of the Dodgson and Young SCFs. For example, the Dodgson scheme can be
made homogeneous by defining from the function DodgsonScore for each preference profile 〈C, V 〉
and designated candidate c ∈ C the function
DodgsonScore∗(C, c, V ) = lim
q→∞
DodgsonScore(C, c, qV )
q
.
The resulting SCF is denoted by Dodgson∗ SCF, and the corresponding winner and ranking
problems are denoted by Dodgson∗ Winner and Dodgson∗ Ranking. Analogously, the Young
voting scheme defined in Section 2.2 can be made homogeneous by defining YoungScore∗.
Remarkably, Young [You77] showed that the corresponding problem Young∗ Winner can be solved
by a linear program. Hence, the problem Young∗ Winner is efficiently solvable, since the problem
Linear Programming can be decided in polynomial time [Hacˇ79], see also [Kar84]. We establish
an analogous result for the problems Dodgson∗ Winner and Dodgson∗ Ranking below.
Theorem 3.2 Dodgson∗ Winner and Dodgson∗ Ranking can be solved in polynomial time.
Proof. Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89b] provided an integer linear program for determining
the Dodgson score of a given candidate c. They noted that if the number of candidates is fixed, then
the winner problem for Dodgson elections (in the inhomogeneous case defined in Section 2.2) can
be solved in polynomial time using the algorithm of Lenstra [Len83].
Based on their integer linear program, we provide a linear program for computing
DodgsonScore∗(C, c, V ) for a given preference profile 〈C, V 〉 and a given candidate c. Since
Linear Programming is polynomial-time solvable [Hacˇ79], it follows that the problems Dodgson∗
Winner and Dodgson∗ Ranking can be solved in polynomial time, even if the number of candidates
is not prespecified.
Let a profile 〈C, V 〉 and a candidate c ∈ C be given, and let V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}. Our linear
program has the variables xi,j , ei,j,k, and wk, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ ‖C‖−1, and k ∈ C−{c}.
Then, DodgsonScore∗(C, c, V ) is the value of the linear program
min
∑
i,j
j · xi,j (3.9)
subject to the constraints:
(1) ∑j xi,j = 1 for each voter vi;
(2) ∑i,j ei,j,k · xi,j + wk > n2 for each candidate k ∈ C − {c};
(3) 0 ≤ xi,j ≤ 1 for each i and j.
The variables and constraints can be interpreted as follows. For given i and j, xi,j is a rational
number in the interval [0, 1] that gives the percentage v
q
i,j
q
, where q is the least common multiple of
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the denominators in all xi,j , and vqi,j is the number of voters among the q replicants of voter vi in
which c is moved upwards by j positions. For given i, j, and k, ei,j,k = 1 if the result of moving c
upwards by j positions in the preference order of voter vi is that c gains one additional vote against
candidate k, and ei,j,k = 0 otherwise. For any candidate k other than c, wk gives the number of
voters who prefer c over k. Hence, the set of constraints (2) ensures that c becomes a Condorcet
winner. The set of constraints (1) ensures that vqi,j , summed over all possible positions j, equals
the number q of all replicants of voter vi. The objective is to minimize the number of switches
needed to make c a Condorcet winner. For the homogeneous case of Dodgson elections, the linear
program (3.9) tells us how many times we have to replicate each voter vi (namely, q times) and in
how many of the replicants of each voter vi the given candidate c has to be moved upwards by how
many positions in order to achieve this objective.
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